1.
After fifteen years of intensive effort, the nations of the world, with full participation by the United States, produced a comprehensive Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States would not become a party to the Convention. But formal abstention from the Convention is hardly a complete national oceans policy for the United States. Indeed, that abstention compels the United States to attend carefully to its posture, in law and policy, toward the Convention itself and to each of its many provisions on matters of major interest to the United States.
The United States dissociated itself from the Convention essentially because of disagreement with a number of its dispositions in respect of mining in the deep seabed. It has not disowned the spirit and import of the Convention as a whole, or any of its other provisions.
We believe that it is in the interest of the United States to recognize the Convention as representing the normative expression by the states of the world reflecting their common or respective interests at the end of the 20th century. Leaving aside the question of deep seabed mining, we believe that the provisions of the Convention achieve a workable regime that would promote order at sea and satisfy the complex of competing interests of different states.
Deep seabed mining is still a distant prospect and is of little present economic value. U.S. reservations as to the regime for deep seabed mining should be the subject of continued negotiation; they should not undermine the profound and wide consensus that has been achieved otherwise. Acceptance by the United States of the Convention, and of its dispositions generally, in fact if not in form, is in the interest of the United States and of mankind.
2.
Until well into this century the law of the sea was stable and generally agreed. Its essential principle was the freedom of the seas, which implied freedom of navigation, both civil and military, and freedom to take the sea's resources, essentially its fish. The exception to freedom for all was a small territorial sea in which coastal states exercised exclusive rights, subject to a right of innocent passage for vessels of other states.
The history of the law of the sea in the past half century is a history of coastal-state expansion. The United States took a large step in that [Vol. 79 direction in 1945 when it claimed the mineral resources of the continental shelf and a special interest in fisheries conservation beyond its territorial sea. Ever more firmly, other states began to claim ever larger zones of exclusive fishing rights, sometimes larger zones of exclusive economic rights generally, or even large territorial seas.
The once clear and stable law of the sea became unclear and unstable. Coastal states became less restrained about asserting the right to control more activities of foreign vessels and foreign nationals in areas extending ever farther from their shores. Because the maritime powers themselves took part in this expansionist trend, limiting certain freedoms off their coasts as it suited their interests, it became increasingly difficult for them to explain why any other coastal state could not restrict high seas freedoms of interest to the maritime powers to the extent it suited its interests. It became increasingly difficult to distinguish between a principled assertion of universal legal rights by the maritime powers and an attempt to impose their will, in their own interests, on other coastal states. For the United States, committed to the rule of law, it became increasingly difficult and costly to do more than protest the claims of others adverse to its maritime interests.
Although publicity and prominence were given to the distant prospect of mining the deep seabed, the live issues of the law of the sea have concerned authority in coastal areas. By the end of the 1960s, pressures for change in the law of the sea generated two fundamental questions:
(1) How much authority may a coastal state exercise, how far from its shores, for what purposes, and how much freedom is guaranteed there for other states and their nationals?
(2) How could one achieve stable answers to that question, which would provide a legal foundation for exercising or enforcing rights and which all states are likely to accept and regard as legally binding over time?
3.
One important goal of the United States in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was to restore order and stability to the law of the sea. It sought to achieve this goal by giving primary emphasis to three principles:
(1) The rules of the law of the sea must fairly balance the respective interests of all states, notably the competing coastal and maritime interests, in a manner that is generally acceptable.
(2) Multilateral negotiations on the basis of consensus should replace unilateral claims of right as the principal means for determining that balance.
(3) Compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms should be adopted to interpret, apply and enforce the balance.
The conference succeeded in resolving the fundamental questions of the law of the sea in accordance with these three principles.
4.
The most important question of oceans policy facing the United States is whether we will conform our behavior to that consensus. President Reagan, while rejecting the Convention on the Law of the Sea because of its system of regulating deep seabed mining, expressly recognized that the balance of interests achieved in the Convention in respect of coastal areas was in the interests of the United States and the international community as a whole. He announced that the United States would act in the future in a manner consistent with that balance.
It is of paramount importance that the United States scrupulously conform its behavior to the provisions of the Convention. Our rejection of the deep seabed mining portion of the Convention in itself inevitably tempts other states to think in terms of rejecting or making exceptions to other provisions. However, the deep seabed mining system is not relevant as such to the fundamental issues of coastal state rights and high seas freedoms in coastal areas. (Nor is substantial mining beyond the economic zone and continental shelf likely in the near future.) But virtually all of the other provisions of the Convention deal directly or indirectly with those fundamental issues.
If the United States begins to carve out exceptions to those provisions for itself, it may undo the balance and encourage other unilateral exceptions. If the U.S. Government makes exceptions for itself, it will inevitably be less effective in persuading other governments that they may not carve out other exceptions that suit them, and will be increasingly less effective in persuading the American people and America's allies that decisive action is needed to ensure respect for our legal rights off foreign coasts. We will lose both an acceptable balance of rights and duties and a unique opportunity to stabilize that balance around a set of rules worked out by consensus of all the nations of the world. The new opportunity for building a universal "customary law" around the rules described by the Convention will disintegrate. Instead, there will be strong impetus for development of different rules that will entail restriction on freedom of navigation and overflights and the conduct of military activities in vast coastal areas, restrictions which are not in the interest of the United States.
5.
The only realistic hope for building a stable and acceptable "customary law" of coastal state rights and duties at this time depends on the United States respecting all the relevant rules of the new Convention and persuading others to do the same. Unless we do so, we will increasingly face three expensive choices with respect to any foreign state's claim of control over our navigation or military activities off its coast:
(1) resistance, with the potential for prejudice to other U.S. interests in that coastal state, for confrontation or violence, and for domestic discord; (2) acquiescence, leading inevitably to a weakening of our position of principle with respect to other coastal states (verbal protests to the contrary notwithstanding) and domestic pressures to emulate the contested claims; or (3) bilateral negotiation, in which we will be expected to offer a political, economic or military quid pro quo in proportion to our interest in navigation and military activities that, under the Convention's rules, can be conducted free of such bilateral concessions. (Bilateral negotiation limited to reciprocal exchange of navigation or military privileges will not succeed since most foreign states do not have the same interest in exercising navigational and military freedoms off our coasts as we have off theirs.)
6.
We recommend the following first steps:
(1) The United States should adopt a clear and consistent policy, applicable to all organs of the U.S. Government, of adherence to all of the rules of the Convention, excluding at most only those dealing with the regulation of mining by the International Sea-Bed Authority. The United States need not exercise all its rights (e.g., it need not extend its territorial sea or require consent for scientific research in its economic zone if it prefers not to), but it must scrupulously respect all its duties, including the limitations on its rights.
(2) The United States should encourage and urge other states, including its allies, to do the same.
(3) Means should be sought to make compulsory dispute settlement an effective part of our policy and that of other nations, binding at least on the basic issues of navigation and pollution. The Panel recommends three "first steps":
(1) "The United States should adopt a clear and consistent policy, applicable to all organs of the U.S. Government, of adherence to all of the rules of the Convention, excluding at most only those dealing with the regulation of mining by the International Sea-Bed Authority. The United States need not exercise all its rights (e.g., it need not extend its territorial sea or require consent for scientific research in its economic zone if it prefers not to), but it must scrupulously respect all its duties, including the limitations on its rights."
My comments in this respect are the following: (2) "The United States should encourage and urge other states, including its allies, to do the same." I agree concerning navigational issues; and the government is doing so.
(3) "Means should be sought to make compulsory dispute settlement an effective part of our policy and that of other nations, binding at least on the basic issues of navigation and pollution."
Even if a policy choice were made to adopt this approach, does your Panel have any suggestions as to how this might be effectively accomplished in a technical sense?
Again, thank you for forwarding the Panel's statement. It is always interesting to hear from such a highly respected group of specialists. I was pleased to receive your letter of June 13, 1984 about our Panel Statement on U.S. Policy on the Law of the Sea. We had intended the statement as an encouragement to the administration in its decision to accept the rules of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (excluding those on deep seabed mining).
FRED C. IKLi

Under Secretary of Defense
Our concerns lie with the future. We fear that our failure to sign the Convention has left the impression in some quarters that U.S. actions need not consider the Convention. We view our April 27 statement as a blueprint for future action, which we believe-and you confirm-is consistent with administration policy.
Here are some of the reasons for our concerns and some examples of potential danger:
(1) The President's Proclamation of March 10, 1983 and his accompanying statement do not explicitly commit the United States to consistency with the Convention in all areas of oceans policy. The statement refers explicitly only to navigation and overflight and is vague with respect to other nonseabed issues. We believe that the Proclamation and statement should be read as meaning that U.S. policy should be consistent with the Convention in all respects (except with respect to deep seabed mining). It would be desirable that that be made clear and explicit in an appropriate memorandum or directive addressed to all concerned.
(2) The legislation introduced in Congress on March 10 and March 11, 1983 to implement an exclusive economic zone, etc. (S. 750/H.R. 2061) was not fully consistent with the LOS Convention provisions on the subjects covered, nor with the President's Proclamation and oceans policy statement.
( What is needed, we believe, is a firm and clear presidential directive to all departments and agencies, and a firm and clear communication by the President to Congress, that it is U.S. policy to conform to the Convention in all respects (other than deep seabed mining). The President should assure that the review of relevant legislation and regulations, which I understand is now in progress, will lead to any amendments necessary to assure conformity with the Convention. The United States should also be encouraging other states to abide by the Convention in all respects (other than deep seabed mining) so as to support and develop its status as reflecting customary law. We would welcome the initiative and cooperation of DOD to those ends.
Our panel is exploring means to effect compulsory dispute settlement apart from the Convention and will be happy to share our thoughts with you as our work progresses. The panel is also preparing policy papers on specific issues-on navigation, overflight and other high seas freedoms in the exclusive economic zone, on the continental shelf and deep seabed mining, and on the need of a coordinated national oceans policy.
Louis HENKIN 
Chairman, Panel on the Law of Ocean Uses
September 10, 1984
Dear Louis:
Thank you for your follow-on letter of August 17, 1984 , which highlights a position that we both share: the need for a consistent oceans [Vol. 79 policy, based on the principles of law articulated in the non-seabed mining provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
As I'm sure you are aware, the recent N.A.C.O.A. report on the Exclusive Economic Zone reemphasized this need for consistency. DoD input to that report echoed that theme.
We are all working for the same objective-maritime stability-and we are in full agreement that the best way to achieve that objective is to reinforce the customary international law status of the Convention's nonseabed mining provisions. As President Reagan stated in July of 1982, the careful balance of coastal and flag state rights reflected in those provisions serves well the interests of all nations.
I look forward to receiving copies of your Panel's policy papers as they become available. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
While many law schools now offer separate courses or seminars on international human rights law, the number of students exposed to such specialized study remains relatively small.' Human rights law is relevant to many other segments of the law school curriculum-in particular, to courses on constitutional law and individual rights-although little scholarly attention has been devoted to date to integrating appropriate human rights issues into the "bread and butter" courses that all law students take. To begin to address this lacuna, the Procedural Aspects of International Law (PAIL) Institute has undertaken to develop a human rights component or module designed to supplement leading constitutional law course books and present methods of teaching constitutional law.
Draft materials prepared by the Institute and the general topic of "Linkages between International Human Rights and U.S. Constitutional Law" were discussed at a small conference of constitutional and international law course-book editors and professors held in Washington, D.C., on September 23-24, 1983.2
The first of three sessions considered the role of international human rights law in domestic courts from both a contemporary and a historical perspective. One of the undersigned, Richard B. Lillich, offered an overview of the contemporary status of international law in United States courts, referring to the treaty power set forth in Article VI, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and the place of customary international law (the content and impact of which were topics of discussion throughout the conference). He noted that not only were the self-executing provisions of ratified treaties binding on the courts, but also customary international law. 3 In addition, international human rights norms of both types could be used as persuasive evidence to inform or influence the definition of U.S. constitutional norms. 4 Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., then presented a paper on "The United Nations Charter and the Courts," which considered the impact of the Charter on seminal U.S. decisions of the late 1940s and early 1950s. 5 On the basis of research into briefs and arguments in such cases as Oyama v. California, 6 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 7 Shelley v. Kraemer 8 and Boiling v. Sharpe, 9 and other sources, Lockwood concluded that the Charter had a significant impact on the interpretation of constitutional provisions by federal and state courts, even though it was rarely cited in their decisions. The failure to rely explicitly on the Charter was explained by judicial reluctance to admit a greater role for international law, which was to some extent beyond the control of the United States, as well as then prevalent U.S. political realities such as isolationism and the defense of racial segregation.
These presentations engendered a lively debate about the actual and appropriate role of international law in constitutional decision making. Not all participants believed that even the early influence of the Charter had been sufficiently proved, and some participants questioned whether utilization of international human rights norms necessarily would result in greater protection for individual rights. In the area of freedom of speech, for example, it was generally agreed that U.S. constitutional rights were broader than similar protections provided under international law. On the other hand, it was noted that Reid v. Covert'° established the principle that constitutional rights could not be diminished by treaty, so that international law would be used to expand protections or fill gaps left in U.S. law rather than to restrict existing rights.
It was suggested that international human rights norms might be relevant in litigation that has an impact on international concerns, such as cases involving aliens, but that they were less likely to be helpful in cases involving only domestic concerns. While explicit constitutional norms such as equal protection and due process might be informed by international law, one participant thought it inappropriate either to fill constitutional "gaps" or to develop less well defined rights (such as under the Ninth [Vol. 79
Amendment) with international concepts. In response, it was suggested that discrimination on the grounds of race, sex or alienage did involve the international image and obligations of the United States and that developing international human rights law could be most helpful in interpreting dynamic constitutional rights. Several participants noted that the courts still were reluctant to utilize international law in a significant manner. In two recent cases concerning discrimination in the provision of free elementary education to undocumented alien children" and racial discrimination by tax-exempt religious schools,' 2 the U.S. Supreme Court had not considered international law, though international norms were relevant. On the other hand, international human rights norms were applied by lower courts in the cases of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala' 5 and Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson. 14 Discussions during the second session continued to focus on the substantive and procedural relationship between international human rights and constitutional law. The Filartiga and Rodriguez-Fernandez cases were examined, and the suggestion made that a clearer distinction needed to be drawn between the binding and informative roles of international law. Gordon A. Christenson summarized his thesis' 5 that international norms might be particularly relevant to equal protection analyses, as courts attempt to decide the appropriate level of scrutiny that should be applied to allegedly unconstitutional discrimination.
It was stated that Rodriguez-Fernandez could be distinguished as a case involving a person theoretically outside the jurisdiction of the United States, which made the use of international law appropriate. There was no statutory provision squarely in point and, even under the reasoning of the district court, international law did not override federal law but rather took precedence over an executive order for tle plaintiff's continued detention.
Concern was expressed by some participants over the supposedly vague nature of international human rights law, in particular, customary international law norms. It was agreed that proving customary international law was a difficult task. An examination of state practice and opinio juris was necessary,' 6 and customary international law was probably less important than suggested by some human rights advocates. torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, systematic racial discrimination and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights as violations of customary international law. 7 Other possible violations of international human rights law such as sex discrimination were not thought to rise to the level of customary international law, although there was disagreement as to whether the draft Restatement could be considered authoritative on this issue.
The self-executing nature of human rights treaties, few of which have been ratified by the United States, also was discussed. The shift in modern treaties from narrowly focused bilateral treaties concerned with external affairs to much broader multilateral instruments with domestic impact was noted. One participant stated that the latter almost always are regarded as non-self-executing.'" The wide-ranging nature of these treaties also gives rise to numerous reservations, in order not to disturb the domestic order unduly. Nevertheless, ratification still retains symbolic significance and entails international obligations. Other participants thought that ratified human rights treaties should be as easily enforceable in U.S. courts as other international agreements.
While the participants disagreed about the present impact and binding effect of international human rights law on individual rights litigation in the United States, there was greater agreement on the helpful comparative role that it could play in both teaching and submissions to courts. It was observed that Canadian courts were much more likely to look at international law from a comparative perspective, i.e., to consider how other national courts have interpreted the same or similar provisions. The greater impact of European human rights jurisprudence, which is often more legalistic and reasoned than the decisions of other international bodies, also was noted.
The third and final session was devoted to specific pedagogical issues raised by the introduction of international human rights law into the existing constitutional framework. There was a general consensus that the major obstacles to the introduction or integration of international materials are (1) a lack of time (several participants noted that the basic constitutional law course already excludes many important issues and that it would be difficult to add new material); (2) the lack of direct or demonstrated relevance of international human rights law to decision making by the Supreme Court, which is the almost exclusive focus of most constitutional law courses; and (3) the difficulty of preparing materials narrow enough to be useful with respect to a particular issue (e.g., freedom of speech), yet comprehensive enough to enable constitutional law professors to feel reasonably comfortable with their own knowledge of the topic. Several participants noted that they did use international materials and examples in their own constitutional law courses, but that they did so out of personal interest and expertise, which mitigated at least the third problem mentioned above. Other participants emphasized the time problem, noting that even broad areas such as the treaty power under the Constitution receive at best cursory treatment. One participant questioned whether allotting more time to international human rights would not overemphasize its significance.
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
Most participants believed that a comparative approach that considered only a few substantive rights in some detail was pedagogically preferable to the more general and comprehensive draft materials prepared by the institute for the conference. Among the specific suggestions for materials that would be most helpful were the preparation of excerpts of major European cases that could be compared with corresponding U.S. cases; the focusing of materials on the substantive areas of the First Amendment, the right to privacy and equal protection; and the development of materials appropriate to interdisciplinary or undergraduate courses.
Other recommendations for education in this area were to offer a 3-to 6-week summer workshop on international law for constitutional law professors, perhaps also with some student participation; to provide more effective and active clinical programs in international human rights law; and to reinforce the teaching of private international law as a means of dealing with some of the issues related to treaties.
Despite the international implications of many recent federal court cases,' 9 the growth of the international law of human rights, and the Supreme Court's celebrated injunction that "international law is part of our law," 20 the PAIL Institute conference highlights the gap that remains between international and constitutional scholars. There seems to be strong intellectual interest in bridging this gap, particularly among those participants who specialize in individual rights. At the same time, candor requires internationalists to recognize that international human rights law has not yet become a significant (or indeed, more than a marginal) factor in constitutional decision making in the minds of most constitutional lawyers, although the number of practitioners employing international law arguments in the courts is steadily increasing.
The two major barriers to a fuller integration of international human rights law into constitutional law courses are lack of knowledge and time. The conference itself and the revised materials subsequently prepared by the Institute and now available for classroom use 2 ' have begun to address 2' The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 21 The revised materials have been published as Materials on International Human Rights and U.S. Constitutional Law (H. Hannum ed. 1985). Included are extracts from significant decisions of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American the former, and several participants indicated that some of the human rights issues raised during the two days of discussions would be likely to appear in some form in their own courses. While time pressures may prevent, more than passing reference to international human rights law in most constitutional law courses, closing the knowledge gap should contribute significantly to the insertion of international concerns by individual professors according to their own particular interests. Whether these concerns are addressed comparatively or in the context of defining substantive constitutional rights, the intellectual and legal perspective gained may broaden the too often narrow presentation of constitutional law and rights now received by many students. RICHARD 
B. LILLICH AND HURST HANNUM* THE MOON TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE
On July 11, 1984, the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies' entered into force following the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the fifth instrument of ratification. The Agreement, following its adoption by the General Assembly, was opened for signature on December 18, 1979. In the intervening years, it has been signed by Austria, Chile, France, Guatemala, India, Morocco, the Netherlands, Peru, the Philippines, Romania and Uruguay. The fifth state to deposit its ratification was Austria, which followed Chile, the Philippines, Uruguay and the Netherlands.
Unlike 5 The 1979 Moon Agreement, which was comprehensively negotiated between 1970 and 1979, reemphasizes some of the basic provisions contained in the 1967 Principles Treaty. It also augments that agreement in several instances, such as by defining the moon to include orbits around or other trajectories to or around it. The demilitarization provisions of the Principles Treaty are enlarged by providing, for example, that threats or use of force may not take place on the moon relating to the Earth, the moon, spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or man-made objects. Wider prohibitions against the use of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction than appear in the 1967 Treaty were adopted.
Freedom of scientific investigation is emphasized in several articles. Explorers are specifically authorized to collect and remove from the moon samples of minerals and other substances. Moon rocks and other substances may be used in quantities appropriate to the support of national missions. International scientific preserves are contemplated.
Space stations may be established on the moon. The states parties retain jurisdiction and control over their personnel and physical objects and are required to provide notice of accidents in certain circumstances. Moon activities may be engaged in by juridical and natural persons, including "non-governmental" entities. and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement and in particular in paragraph 5 of this article." This latter formulation was duly noted by the International Law Section of the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1981 when it stressed that the ocean and space uses of the expression were not the same. The members of the section concluded that the formulation of the Moon Agreement was unique and could not be used or interpreted "in any other context." ' To secure the ultimate implementation of the common heritage principle, 7 paragraph 5 of Article 11 and Article 18 authorize states parties to the Agreement to establish "an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible." Paragraph 7 of Article 11 identifies the main purposes of the proposed international regime. They include the orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the moon, the rational management of those resources and the expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources. A further purpose that caused some debate calls for "[a]n equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given special consideration." Much was made of the fact during the negotiations, and subsequently, that this provision requires an "equitable," but not an "equal," sharing of potential benefits.
The opponents of the Moon Agreement have suggested that the common heritage provision might be inconsistent with the critical terms of Article 1 of the 1967 Principles Treaty, which provides that the space environment (outer space per se, the moon and other celestial bodies) and its natural resources may be freely and equally explored, exploited and used by all states and that they are to have free access to these areas and resources. The International Law Section has responded that the common heritage principle was adopted in concert with the recognition that (i) all States have equal rights to explore and use the Moon and its natural resources, and (ii) that no State or other entity has an exclusive right of ownership, property, or appropriation over the Moon, over any area of the surface or subsurface of the Moon, or over its natural resources in place.
8
Opponents have also suggested that the common heritage principle might cause a state to lose jurisdiction and control over national space These doubts of the critics stemmed from their basic argument that the Agreement made inroads on the free enterprise system. Yet both the language and the negotiating history of the Agreement are consonant with and protective of the interests of private entrepreneurs. For this reason, the members of the section concluded that the Agreement assures that the parties to it "retain exclusive jurisdiction and control over their facilities, stations and installations on the Moon, and that other States Parties are obligated to avoid interference with normal operations of such facilities."'" The present res communis rights of those who are able to engage in the exploration, exploitation and use of the area and its resources are fully recognized.
The ABA's Section of Natural Resources Law initially raised objections about the terms and purpose of the Moon Agreement. Its members feared that acceptance of the common heritage principle might prejudice the then current negotiations on the law of the sea, as well as the future of Antarctica. They believed that the provisions of Article 11(5), relating to a future international legal regime and appropriate procedures for implementing it, would impose unacceptable "control [on] U.S. space investigations."" The section also urged that "a moratorium on exploration and exploitation of space resources is inherent in the Moon Treaty, pending establishment of machinery to govern such activities under the control of the international regime."' 2 This proposition was contrary to the position taken by the United States during the negotiations. The United States had indicated that the Agreement "places no moratorium upon the exploitation of the natural resources on celestial bodies, pending the establishment of an international regime."' 3 In an immediate response, the Soviet representative raised no objections to the interpretation put forward by the United States. contained in the report of the International Law Section, with modest changes in terminology, and deferred to the Natural Resource Law Section's concern about the meaning to be accorded to the common heritage principle. Thus, while the sections recognized that the moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind, they concluded that (i) all States have the rights to explore and use the Moon and its natural resources, and (ii) that no State or other entity has an exclusive right of ownership over the Moon, over any area of the surface or subsurface of the Moon, or over its natural resources which have not been, or are not actually in the process of being, extracted or used by actual development activities on the Moon. 6 This language was intended to make certain that property rights appertain to any juridical or natural person that comes into possession of a moonbased natural resource by removing that resource from its original "in place" position. The statement was designed to ensure that the common heritage principle would not thwart the free enterprise opportunities of firms prior to the time, undoubtedly remote, when the international regime and the "appropriate procedures" provisions of Article 11(5) were implemented. That such exploitation was considered by the framers of the Agreement to be a distant event was evidenced by the phrase in Article 11(5) "as such exploitation is about to become feasible."
Although Soviet experts have speculated recently whether the "appropriate procedures" clause might lead to the formation of a supranational governmental body, it is clear that despite early criticisms of the Agreement by Soviet negotiators, it was accepted and endorsed by the Soviet Union. Further, since only the parties to the Agreement will have a hand in creating the new moon organization, it will be up to them to identify its powers and duties. Only after they have done so will it be possible to determine whether the new institution is endowed with the traditional functions of international intergovernmental organizations, or whether the moon organization is quite unique.
The Agreement provides for an orderly transition from the limited resource exploitation of recent years to something more grandiose at a future date. At the moment, the rule is that of freedom of exploitation by all pursuant to the res communis principle. When exploitation on a large-scale basis is feasible, an international legal regime will become necessary; it will be created by the parties to the Agreement to support the newly activated common heritage principle. Only they will be allowed to effect distributions of benefits on an equitable basis, taking into account the interests and needs of the less-developed countries, as well as the efforts of the states engaged in space exploitation.
While the novelty of the common heritage principle may have produced some concerns in the United States, undoubtedly much influenced by present uncertainties about how the sharing of benefits may work out in 16 Id. at 9 1.
[Vol. 79 practice, no such concerns were expressed by one group of experts whose members are not based in less-developed countries. In 1982 the Space Law Committee of the International Law Association urged the early ratification of the Agreement. 17 Although both nations supported the Agreement at the United Nations in 1979, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has formally approved it. By contrast, both are parties to the four other UN-negotiated international space law agreements. Perhaps the 1979 Agreement, like other international agreements designed to serve the reciprocal necessities of these two states, has become a casualty of the important differences that now separate the countries. These differences are most noticeable in the areas of arms control and disarmament, and the Moon Agreement does contain an important limitation on the threat or use of force on and around the moon.
Aside from the detriment to the national interests of the United States caused by the absence of a truly effective and verifiable general system of arms control and disarmament, can the nonratification of the Moon Agreement cause injury to the commercial interests of this country? The parties to the Agreement are accorded basic exploitative rights that are not accorded to nonparties. While only France, among the present parties, can be considered as having space capabilities, such capabilities are not necessary for a state to be able to profit from adoption of the Agreement. National entrepreneurs are already looking for flag-of-convenience countries as bases for communications and remote sensing activities.
One of the parties to the Agreement could conceivably enter into arrangements with a foreign private firm that has launch and operational capabilities. While such arrangements may not be made soon, or at all, the entry into force of the Moon Agreement may still indicate that the United States would be well-advised to make a hardheaded appraisal of what may be gained or lost from not ratifying it. The 26 members of the Sub-Commission are elected by the Commission on Human Rights every three years, with due respect given to geographic representation.' This year, for the first time, the alternate for each expert was elected together with the expert, which represented a major reform over the previous practice. Formerly, elected experts could designate their alternates; the alternate would frequently be a government official in Geneva of the same nationality as the expert.
2 Nineteen alternates were elected by the Commission, 3 and several actively participated in this year's session. 4 Procedures are needed, however, to ensure that no team of experts has an extra opportunity to intervene on a particular agenda item simply because both the expert and the alternate happen to be present. 5 
Violations of Human Rights in Specific Countries
The Sub-Commission considers instances of human rights violations in specific countries in three ways: (1) under the procedure established by Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1503;6 (2) under the specific agenda item authorized by ECOSOC Resolution 1235; 7 and (3) under a general agenda item where violations in a specific country are used to illustrate or highlight a problem covered by the agenda item.
The Working Group on Communications, established pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 1503, considered hundreds of petitions submitted to the United Nations alleging human rights violations in specific countries.' Because the working group, Sub-Commission and Commission consider IIn general, member countries of the United Nations are divided into the following five geographic areas: (1) Africa, (2) Asia, (3) Eastern Europe, (4) Latin America, and (5) " The alternate from Argentina replaced the expert nominated by his country for the entire session, served as rapporteur for the Sub-Commission, participated actively in the session and was assigned to prepare two reports. Other alternates who participated frequently were those from the United States and the Soviet Union.
Under one agenda item at this year's session, the alternate for the Soviet Union took the floor after the expert from the Soviet Union had already intervened under the same item. A number of experts protested, but no formal resolution of the issue was reached. [Vol. 79 1503-related matters in closed sessions, the only public source of information on these matters is the statement by the head of the Commission prior to its public debate. At its last session, the Commission named 11 countries as gross violators of human rights and dismissed three from consideration. 9 Of the three countries dismissed, it can be assumed that petitions pertaining to Pakistan and Malaysia were later considered by the working group and the Sub-Commission. In light of the situation in these countries-particularly in Pakistan-it will be interesting to see whether the Sub-Commission forwarded either country to the Commission, and, if so, how the Commission will react.
Pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 1235, the Sub-Commission annually devotes an agenda item to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This agenda item has evolved to the point where it provides a flexible and public forum for publicizing human rights violations in specific countries. At this year's session, there was an attempt by the expert from the Soviet Union to restrict the mention of specific countries by SubCommission members;'° however, as in the past, both Sub-Commission members and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)" detailed instances of violations of human rights in specific countries under this agenda item. Although dozens of countries from every region of the world were mentioned, among those receiving considerable attention were Guatemala, Indonesia (with respect to East Timor), South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and Uruguay.
At one point, members of the Sub-Commission attempted to question the Indonesian observer with respect to East Timor, following Indonesia's exercise of the right of reply.
2 After considerable wrangling over the propriety of permitting questions to be posed to a government observer, 13 the Sub-Commission decided to permit the Indonesian observer to "clarify" his remarks in response to the questions posed. The observer, however, declined to respond, contending that the questions went beyond the scope of the Sub-Commission's authority. " The experts from the United Kingdom, Greece and Cuba all posed pointed questions to the Indonesian observers regarding Indonesia's recognition of various UN resolutions concerning self-determination for East Timor.
1" The experts from the Soviet Union and China objected to the "cross-examination" procedure as unprecedented.
In another exchange, the Soviet expert took the floor shortly after the expert from the United States had commented on the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, specifically mentioning the case of Andrei Sakharov and the situation of Soviet Jews, as typified by the case of Iosif Begun, a Hebrew teacher convicted in 1983 of slandering the Soviet state and sentenced to a 12-year prison term. In his 45-minute intervention,' 4 the Soviet expert first characterized the intervention by Dr. Sakharov's son-in-law on behalf of the International League for Human Rights as a sham. He then proceeded to catalog the human rights violations in the United States, mentioning in particular the case of Leonard Peltier, a Native American.' 5 Sub-Commission members and NGO representatives alike discussed violations by specific countries under general agenda items. Under the agenda item covering the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, although other countries were mentioned, 6 emphasis was placed on the situation in South Africa. The Sub-Commission considered an updated report by Ahmad Khalifa, which purported to identify all banks, transnational corporations and other organizations "whose activities constitute assistance to the colonial and racist regime in Southern Africa."
' " 7 Although the report-which lists close to four thousand organizations-appears comprehensive, at least two experts from Western countries criticized its failure to name organizations in non-Western countries that carry on trade with South Africa.' 8 Under the agenda item covering the human rights of the mentally ill, reference was made to the situation in Japanese mental hospitals. The following day, the pertinent NGO intervention was front-page news in almost every major Japanese newspaper and, within weeks, legislation was introduced to regulate the admission and treatment of mental hospital patients.'
9 Although Japan represents a somewhat atypical example, it illustrates how the publicity given to violations of human rights in certain countries by the Sub-Commission can provide the impetus for the improvement of a specific situation. 
Indigenous Populations
The Working Group on Indigenous Populations was established in 1982. Its mandate was to develop standards pertaining to rights of indigenous populations and to review recent developments affecting indigenous populations.
2 1 In its first 2 years, under the chairmanship of Asbjorn Eide, the working group adopted a flexible procedure that permitted the representatives of indigenous populations-including those without consultative status with ECOSOC 22 -to participate actively in the meetings of the working group.
23
This year's working group once again provided indigenous groups from many parts of the world with an opportunity to bring to the attention of a United Nations organ the specific problems facing particular indigenous peoples. Also of note was the active participation of a number of observers from governments with large indigenous populations. 24 After reviewing the report of the working group, the Sub-Commission adopted a lengthy resolution requesting that the working group consider drafting a body of principles on indigenous rights, beginning at its next session.
25
The Sub-Commission also approved a proposal for the establishment of a voluntary fund to be used to facilitate the participation of representatives of indigenous groups in the deliberations of the working group. 2 6 The proposal would establish a five-person board of trustees, including at least one member of a widely recognized organization of indigenous people.
27
If established as proposed, 2 8 the fund would represent a step, albeit a minor one, in recognizing a representative of an indigenous group as an active participant in a UN-controlled body.
Rights Law Group submitted a 1503 communication concerning the Korean minority in Japan. Following the intervention, the Law Group was assured that steps would be taken to remedy the situation legislatively.
21 ESC Res. 1982 
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1 Id. at 10. 27 Id. " The establishment of the fund must still be approved by the Commission on Human Rights and ECOSOC. The Commission authorized the Sub-Commission to consider its feasibility. See Commission on Human Rights Res. 1984/32, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/77, at 68. However, it remains to be seen whether the Sub-Commission's propoal, which represented a compromise between the position of indigenous groups seeking greater control of the fund and that of government representatives objecting to any acknowledgment of indigenous groups as entities recognized by the United Nations, will be adopted in its present form at the Commission's next session.
Slaverv
The Slavery Working Group was established in 1974.29 At this year's session, as in past years, NGOs dominated the working group's meetings, publicizing specific instances of slavery or slavery-like practices throughout the world.
Although no major initiatives emanated from the working group this session, its effectiveness was illustrated by the mission sent in January 1984 to investigate the practice of slavery in Mauritania and measures that might be taken to eradicate it." The mission was the result of an intervention by the Anti-Slavery Society at a 1981 working group session. In his report, Marc Bossuyt, the expert designated by the Sub-Commission, concluded that the Government of Mauritania was taking steps to eliminate slavery but should be encouraged nonetheless to increase its activities in this area." He also suggested a number of concrete steps that the Government should implement to assist former slaves and others who continue living in slave-like conditions.
2
State of Emergency
Last year, pursuant to a decision of the Commission on Human Rights, the Working Group on Detention was asked to prepare a list of countries in which a state of emergency had been declared or terminated.
3 A list supplied by the United Nations Centre for Human Rights contained only countries that had informed the United Nations that they had derogated from their obligations under the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. 4 Some members of the working group expressed uncertainty about the standards that could be used to draw up a list based on less objective criteria.
The working group proposed, and the Sub-Commission agreed, that the expert from Argentina should prepare an explanatory paper on the ways and means for the future preparation of such a list. 5 To avoid further delay, it is hoped that the expert will also provide specific examples of countries where states of emergency are currently in effect. [Vol. 79
Instruments
The Working Group on Universal Acceptance of Human Rights Instruments was established in 1979 to encourage acceptance of international human rights instruments. 3 6 It was authorized to call upon governments that have not ratified various human rights instruments to explain their inaction. 7 Unfortunately, few governments have participated in the working group's sessions.
On the basis of the working group's report, 3 " the Sub-Commission requested that the Secretary-General consider the possibility of offering technical assistance and designating regional advisers to facilitate the adoption of human rights instruments by more countries."tI The SubCommission also decided to suspend the working group, and instead to appoint a member of the Sub-Commission to prepare a status report. 40 In view of the inability of the working group to involve more governments in its work, this decision is a positive one.
Studies and Reports
This year only one completed report was presented to the SubCommission: the Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations by Mr. Martinez Cobo. 4 ' The report, which includes several volumes, took 11 years to complete. Most of the report had been presented to the Sub-Commission in previous years, but this year the "Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations" section. was presented for the first time. In preparing the study, Mr. Cobo, together with United Nations staff personnel, visited 37 countries to conduct on-site interviews with government officials and representatives of indigenous populations. 43 The Cobo study thus provides a wealth of information on indigenous populations in various countries. The conclusions, proposals and recommendations should prove useful to the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in drafting a proposed declaration or convention on the rights of indigenous populations.
The impact of the Cobo study will be limited, however, unless an edited version is prepared to facilitate its broad dissemination and use by United Nations bodies and member countries. A Sub-Commission resolution recommends that ECOSOC authorize the UN Secretary-General to prepare an edited and condensed version of the study. A preliminary report on amnesty laws was discussed in great detail by the Sub-Commission. 4 ' The report is designed to provide a frame of reference for those endeavoring to promote amnesty in particular countries, primarily for political offenses. In addition to presenting the history, evolution and typology of amnesty laws, the report presents proposals for dealing with specific problems. The report concludes by noting that the amnesty process can only be effective if it is coupled with social, economic and political measures, such as the lifting of a state of emergency and the holding of free and genuine elections. 46 A final version of the report on amnesty will be submitted to the Sub-Commission at its next session.
The study on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors and the independence of lawyers will be presented to the Sub-Commission next year. 47 Many members expressed concern over the delay in completing the study on this important subject.
The Sub-Commission also reviewed a half-dozen other preliminary reports and approved the initiation of several additional studies, including one on an optional protocol aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. 4 8 The number of these reports and studies is cause for some concern. Although they are the product of each individual expert, their presentation to the Sub-Commission provides an opportunity for a discussion that often will improve their quality and their chances of acceptability to the entire group. This process facilitates building on the recommendations included in a report and preparing a draft declaration and convention on the subject in question. As the number of reports requested by the SubCommission grows, less time is available to examine each one. The result is that, after a report is approved, there is little follow-up activity, even if the report contains specific recommendations.
49
Resolutions
Of the substantive resolutions approved by the Sub-Commission, perhaps the most significant was the one that condemns amputations as a form of cruel and degrading treatment. 5 The resolution as initially proposed focused on the growing practice of amputation in the Sudan. After a charged debate, the resolution was revoked and reference to the Sudan was dropped. However, the adopted resolution has broader implications than the previous country-specific resolution could have had.
experts from Islamic countries, calls on countries that have legislation or practices entailing amputation as punishment to take the necessary steps to provide for alternate, more humane forms of punishment."' Concern was expressed in resolutions regarding the human rights situation in the following countries: Afghanistan and Pakistan, 52 Chile,-3 El Salvador,"' Guatemala," 5 Iran, 5 6 Paraguay, 57 South Africa, 5 Sri Lanka" 9 and Uruguay. 60 Most of the country-specific resolutions involve countries that are the subject of Commission resolutions. 6 ' This year, however; three country-specific resolutions initiated by the Sub-Commission were approved. 62 The most controversial of the country-specific resolutions involved Sri Lanka. At its previous session, the Sub-Commission had adopted a resolution calling on Sri Lanka to submit information to the Commission on Human Rights regarding the communal violence of July 1983.63 The Sri Lankan Government prepared a formal submission for the Commission and, following an energetic lobbying effort by the Sri Lankan representatives, the Commission decided that further consideration of the issue was unnecessary. 6 4 This year's Sub-Commission resolution, which followed on the heels of renewed communal violence, was weaker than the previous one, as it merely called upon the Government to report to the next meeting of the Commission on the progress made in its investigation into violent incidents and its efforts to rectify the situation. 6 5 The experts from the United States and the Soviet Union each introduced three resolutions that the Sub-Commission found too controversial to consider. The resolutions concerned the plights of Andrei Sakharov, 66 launching of a nuclear attack. 7 ' The Sub-Commission avoided debate on these resolutions by characterizing them as "political." It decided that they would be considered only after all the others and then ran out of time before debate could begin on the political resolutions.
The decision to characterize resolutions as "political" because of the countries named in them ensures that certain powerful countries will never be the subject of resolutions. If a rule were adopted that required a resolution to have a minimum number of sponsors before it could be considered by the Sub-Commission, resolutions supported by only one or two experts would not result in lengthy and, most likely, polemical debates.
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Participation by Nongovern mental Organizations
As in past years, NGOs contributed significantly to the work of the Sub-Commission. In addition to providing its members with information pertaining to the human rights situation in specific countries through oral interventions, written statements and informal discussions, NGO representatives lobbied for the adoption of specific resolutions, at times taking a major hand in drafting the resolutions, and fulfilled a significant role in the working group sessions. For example, the efforts of Amnesty International, first in presenting a dramatic intervention on the practice of amputation, 73 and then by following the presentation with a lobbying effort, had considerable influence on the ensuing resolution on amputation.
With respect to oral interventions, the trend in favor of permitting NGOs to discuss specific countries where human rights were being violated continued. 74 A number of individuals presented stark, first-person and eyewitness accounts of human rights violations. 75 Government observers responded to the allegations presented by the NGOs, occasionally impugning the motives and sources of the NGOs presenting the information. 75 For example, a woman from Turkey described the torture she suffered in a Turkish prison. An Ahamadiuya Muslim described the persecution of his sect by the Pakistani Government.
7 For example, the Sri Lankan observer unequivocally denied several NGO statements.
The Guatemalan observer dismissed every NGO statement as totally without foundation.
UN Doc. E/1652, at 8 (1975).
[Vol. 79 country only or included language deemed inappropriate. Representatives of the Centre explained that they were merely reestablishing the policy that existed until 3 years ago.7 s Although the NGOs will have to give more attention to complying with the specifics included in the Centre's guidelines, they should be able to circulate the same type of information.
9
General Observations This year's session raised once again the question of the appropriate role for the Sub-Commission: should it be a forum for publicizing violations of human rights or should it devote its efforts to developing substantive human rights norms? 8 " Most human rights activists hope that the Sub-Commission can fulfill both roles, and frequently it does. However, there are times when the use of the Sub-Commission as a forum for publicizing human rights violations in certain countries results in polemical exchanges, which makes it more difficult to reach consensus on other important issues. The status of the Sub-Commission as a body composed of individual experts frequently is lost during these exchanges.
As was mentioned above, the Sakharov matter, and other allegations of human rights violations in the Soviet Union, contributed to the polemics at this year's session, yet ignoring Sakharov's situation would have been troubling in view of his active defense of human rights over the years in his country and elsewhere. 81 In the end, the resolution on Sakharov was not even debated. Most of the experts from Western Europe and Latin America, while undoubtedly sympathetic to his plight, believed that the resolution was unlikely to pass and that the time spent debating it could be better spent on other matters. The fate of the Sakharov resolution highlights another concern raised by some of the experts and government observers: why are certain countries the subjects of condemnatory resolutions, while other countries, 78 The criteria for circulating a written statement as explained by representatives of the Centre are consistent, for example, with those described in the article, prepared in 1982, on direct intervention at the United Nations. See Kamminga & Rodley, Direct Intervention at the U.N.: NGO Participation in the Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission, in GUIDE, supra note 6, at 186. 79 In particular, the guidelines provide: (1) the statements must be in reference to a human rights item on the agenda; (2) the submitting organization must have special competence in the subject matter of the statement; and (3) a statement containing allegations of human rights violations in a particular country may not be circulated as a UN document except in exceptional instances. A copy of the guidelines, as circulated by the Centre, is on file with the International Human Rights Law Group. with equally poor human rights records, are ignored? The answer resides in the fact that the experts, although in theory independent, too often reflect the views of their home country's government. Thus, the countries with few friends-e.g., Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala-are most likely to be the subject of condemnatory resolutions. In other instances, a country may be the subject of a resolution if a number of experts believe that passage of a resolution would embarrass it into improving its internal situation. For example, while Sri Lanka may not be among the worst violators of human rights in the world, many experts believe that it will respond to adverse publicity about its human rights record.
Similarly, the report on the mission to Mauritania, though criticized off the record for not being sufficiently hard-hitting and for having avoided the particular plight of women altogether, marked the opening of an important channel for assistance on a serious matter between a UN human rights organ and a member country.
8 3 Perhaps other countries will follow Mauritania's example and look to the United Nations for assistance on serious domestic problems relating to human rights.
It will be interesting to see how the Commission on Human Rights reacts to the polemical nature of this year's Sub-Commission in its annual review of the work of the Sub-Commission. Assuming the Commission does not unduly restrict the Sub-Commission's activities, next year's session may be quite productive because it will mark the second year of the members' 3-year terms.
8 4 By that time, the members will have gained the experience of having worked with one another the previous year, but they will probably not be as concerned about their reelection to the SubCommission as in the third year of their terms.
Next year, the Sub-Commission will have before it a number of completed studies. 8 5 Two of the Sub-Commission working groups should complete their work on draft guidelines for the mentally ill and on a draft declaration on unacknowledged detentions.
86 Also next year, the SubCommission for the first time will have separate agenda items on the rights of women and children, 8 7 permitting more detailed study of these [Vol. 79 subjects. Moreover, the Sub-Commission will have before it a draft definition of the term "minority, 8 8 a question that undoubtedly will be the subject of considerable debate.
As the Sub-Commission confronts this crowded list of important initiatives, the debate over its role is certain to continue. At the opening ceremonies, Prime Minister Kamal Hassan Aly delivered President Mubarak's speech, which emphasized the supremacy of the rule of law and the preservation of democratic principles in a free society.
LARRY GARBER
The week-long congress dealt with four topics: crimes of omission, economic and business criminality, diversion and mediation as an alternative to criminal proceedings, and judicial assistance and cooperation in international matters. Each one of these four topics was the object of a special preparatory colloquium held in the 2 years preceding the congress and attended by a national reporter for each national section of the Association. The scientific work produced by these preparatory sessions was then published in one of the issues of the Revue Internationale de Droit Pinal and distributed to all members of the Association prior to the congress.
At the conclusion of the 5 days of discussion on these four topics, a series of resolutions was adopted that will surely have a significant impact on the criminal justice policy of a number of countries.
The Association is one of the oldest and most prestigious scholarly organizations in the world. Founded in 1889 and reorganized in 1924, it now has over three thousand members and associates in 68 countries. Its quarterly, the Revue Internationale de Droit Pinal, is in its 55th year of publication and is subscribed to by some 1,300 law libraries and institutions throughout the world.
In 1972 the Association established the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences in Siracusa, Italy, which every year now conducts approximately eight conferences, seminars and meetings of committees of experts for the United Nations and the Council of Europe. The annual attendance at these activities amounts to some six hundred persons (law professors, judges, prosecutors, government officials, practitioners and researchers). In the last 10 years, the Institute has hosted 66 programs attended by more than four thousand participants from 71 countries, including professors from 193 universities. The Institute publishes some of its proceedings and has issued 37 publications relating to its programs. It has collaborated with 17 international organizations and its activities have been covered extensively by the Italian as well as the international media. ' The author has been Secretary-General of the Association since 1974; he had served as Deputy Secretary-General for the previous 2 years. The first American to have been elected to that post since the organization was created, he was reelected unanimously and by acclamation at the Cairo congress for another 5-year term. He is also Dean of the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences and the coeditor in chief of the Revue Internationale de Droit Pinal.
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